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Abstract
Defection in every period is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium in nitely repeated pris-
oner's dilemma games with complete information. However, in the presence of incomplete
information, players may have an incentive to cooperate in some periods, leading to tit-for-tat
strategies. We describe the decision to comply with recruiting regulations or cheat made by
NCAA Division IA football programs as a nitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. The game
includes incomplete information about the resources devoted to football programs, the recruit-
ing eort made by rival programs, and the behavior of rival programs. We test for evidence that
NCAA Division IA football programs follow tit-for-tat strategies in terms of complying with
or defecting from NCAA recruiting rules using panel data from NCAA Division IA Football
over the period 1976-2005. We nd anecdotal and empirical evidence that is consistent with
tit-for-tat strategies in this setting. The presence of in-conference rivals under NCAA sanctions
increases the probability of a team being placed under sanctions.
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1Introduction
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was ocially formed in 1906 as the Inter-
collegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS). The stated purpose was to govern
collegiate athletic programs and the organization took its current name in 1910. Historically, the
NCAA intervened in the conduct of college athletics in response to widespread belief that stu-
dent athletes' best interests were not being served by establishing guidelines for recruiting athletes
and providing nancial aid to athletes. These guidelines were developed to protect the amateur
status of college athletes. The NCAA further intervened by restricting the number of football
games that could be televised, ostensibly to encourage and preserve live attendance at football
games. (http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1354). According to NCAA regulations, the
recruiting of athletes by colleges and universities that are members of the NCAA, called member
institutions, must be done during specied times during the year, all prospective players, called
student-athletes by the NCAA, must be oered an identical nancial aid package consisting of
tuition and fees to the member institution, room and board, books and a small stipend. The
number of scholarships that can be oered at any time is limited for each sport. The recruitment
and nancial aid rules constitute a cartel agreement among NCAA member institutions to restrict
competition in an input market, the market for new athletes. Absent this agreement, colleges and
universities would have an incentive to oer highly-regarded recruits other inducements to attend
their institution. Economic theory suggests that recruits would not be oered an identical grant-
in-aid package but instead would be oered compensation up to the expected value of his/her value
of marginal product. As with any cartel, credible enforcement and punishment mechanisms need
to exist to deter cheating and ensure cartel stability.
The player recruitment process can be described as a nitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game
with imperfect information. In such games, reputation eects due to informational asymmetries
can generate cooperative behavior in some periods. Kreps and Wilson (1982), Kreps et. al. (1982),
Fudenber and Maskin (1990), and Shapiro (1989) contain discussions of these types of games in
oligopoly theory. In context of the the recruitment of athletes by members of the NCAA, the
cooperative strategy is to comply with the recruiting regulations. Because of monitoring costs, and
the nearly unlimited potential for contact with prospective athletes, NCAA member institutions
have incomplete information about the resources rival schools devote to recruiting eorts, as well
as resources devoted to the football program. In this context, it is possible that member schools
may follow a type of "tit-for-tat" strategy in which schools cooperate by following the recruiting
guidelines only if they believe that all other schools are also cooperating. If, however, a school is
suspected of cheating on the agreement, then the rival school nks on the cheater in a subsequent
2period and the cheater may be subjected to NCAA sanctions. The punished cheater realizes lower
future payos in terms of lower revenue and loss of reputation.
We test for evidence of tit-for-tat strategies in NCAA Division 1A football by examining the
conduct of NCAA Division 1A football programs with respect to complying with the NCAA recruit-
ing rules in Division Ia football over the period 1978-2005. Our analysis of the srategic behavior
of these programs extends the literature in two directions. First, relatively few tests of tit-for-tat
strategies exist in the empirical industrial organization literature. Notable exceptions are studies
by Geroski et al (1987) and Lee (1999). Geroski et al (1987) develop a model in which pricing
conduct is allowed to vary between cooperative and non-cooperative behavior in response to beliefs
about rival rm conduct. They apply the model to the crude oil market and nd that variations in
conduct are important and that a tit-for-tat strategy is roughly consistent with the data. Lee (1999)
conducts an empirical analysis of the bidding behavior for school milk contracts in the Dallas-Fort
Worth and San Antonio areas. He nds evidence of rms following a type of tit-for-tat strategy
in bidding where rms that undercut bids in a particular bid season are often punished by being
underbid in subsequent bid seasons.
Second, our analysis adds to a growing literature on cartel behavior in the NCAA. Much of the
literature examines the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms as well as the eect of enforcement
actions on on-eld performance and competitive balance. There are at least four key studies in
this area. Fleisher et al.(1988) and Fleisher, Go, and Tollison (1992) studied 85 big-time football
programs over the period 1953-1983 and found that the probability of a school receiving sanctions
to be positively correlated with the variability of an institutions on-eld performance in football.
Humphreys and Ruseski (2009) adapt Spence's (1978) signalling model to analyze the enforcement
mechanism when signals about rivals behavior contain a random component and are observed
with a lag. They nd that past on-eld performance is signicantly linked to enforcement of
the cartel agreement. With respect to the eect of enforcement on competitive balance, Eckard
(1998) found that NCAA enforcement of the cartel agreement improved competitive balance in ve
out of seven Division I football conferences. Depken and Wilson (2004) found that institutional
changes in the NCAA related to enforcement of the cartel agreement oset a secular decrease in
competitive balance in Division I football. Finally, Depken and Wilson (2006) investigated the
eects of enforcement of the NCAA cartel agreement on competitive balance and nd that the
greater the level of enforcement in a conference, the better the competitive balance, but the more
severe the punishment, the worse the competitive balance.
In this paper we test for evidence that NCAA Division 1A football programs follow \tit-for-
tat" strategies in terms of complying with or defecting from NCAA recruiting regulations using a
3panel data set for NCAA Division 1A football teams over the period 1978-2005. We empirically
investigate the incidence of penalties across Division 1A football programs and the relationship
between imposition of sanctions past on-eld performance, conference characteristics and additional
control variables. The empirical results indicate that having a rival conference team under sanction
by the NCAA for violating recruiting regulations in the recent past signicantly increases the
probability that a team will be caught violating NCAA recruiting regulations and punished for
this behavior, holding constant other factors that have been shown to aect the administration of
NCAA sanctions in the literature. We interpret this as evidence of tit-for-tat strategic behavior in
NCAA football.
Recruitment in the NCAA Cartel
The Rules of the Recruiting Game
The history of the NCAA recruiting regulations is well documented by the NCAA itself and many
authors including Fleisher, Go and Tollison (1992), Eckard (1998), Depken and Wilson (2004),
Depken and Wilson (2006), and Humphreys and Ruseski (2009). The history is brie
y summarized
here to provide the institutional background necessary to understand the strategic conduct of
NCAA member institutions. At its core, the recruitment process involves the matching of high
school athletes with the athletic programs operated by institutions of higher education. In the US,
public and private secondary schools sponsor a large number of sports teams. The best of these
athletes have the opportunity to continue their amateur athletic career by enrolling in a college or
university that sponsors the sport that the athlete plays. High school athletes are free to enroll
in the college or university of their choice, but those that accept an athletic scholarship from a
college or university must sign a binding \letter of intent" that restricts the athlete to playing for
that particular college or university for the next four seasons.1 NCAA regulations restrict athletes
to four years of competition, except in exceptional circumstances due to injury they also restrict
the number of athletes that can be on an athletic scholarship in each sport, and the academic
requirements for athletes. Once the letter of intent is signed, the athlete cannot attend another
college or university and participate as an athlete without the consent of the head coach at the
institution, and even if this consent is granted, the athlete face penalties in the form of the loss of
one year of eligibility.
The promulgation of the rules and regulations that govern athlete recruitment and intercollegiate
1NCAA student athletes can practice for one season without appearing in contests, a process called \red shirting,"
so athletes often spend ve years attending the college or university they sign with.
4competition was motivated by a growing concern that student athletes were being abused and the
integrity of amateur athletics was being compromised. The rapidly expanding number of post-
season football games was perceived as problematic and member institutions were concerned about
the eect unrestricted television might have on football attendance. In response to these crises, the
NCAA adopted guidelines to govern both the input and output markets of college athletics. These
guidelines, originally known as the \Sanity Code", addressed the recruitment of student athletes
and established committees to enforce the guidelines. The recruiting regulations and the associated
enforcement mechanisms, together with the potential payos to violating the recruiting regulations
give rise to the potential for strategic interaction, including tit-for-tat strategies, be NCAA member
institutions. From an economic perspective, these regulations amount to severe limits on the cost
of acquiring and using inputs to production of athletic events by college athletic programs.
The NCAA recruitment regulations consist of four major components: 1) contacting and evalu-
ating prospective student-athletes during their high school careers; 2) the number and components
of scholarship and nancial aid packages oered to student-athletes; 3) contact between prospec-
tive student-athletes and alumni; and 4) enforcement of the regulations. With respect to the rst
component, the NCAA clearly species the nature of the contact member institutions may have
with athletes in each year of the athlete's high school career and when during the calendar year
this contact can take place. The recruiting calendar varies by sport. For Division 1A football,
the academic year is divided into quiet, evaluation, contact and dead periods. Specic regulations
regarding contacting and evaluating high school players apply during each of these periods. As
an example, the 2008-2009 Division 1 Football Recruiting Calendar (available at www.ncaa.org)
designates August 1 - November 29, 2008 as a quiet period except for42 evaluation days (54 for
U.S. service academies) during the months of September, October and November selected at the
discretion of the institution. Authorized o-campus recruiters are limited to one visit to a prospec-
tive student-athlete's educational institution during this time. The period from November 30, 2008
through January 31, 2006 is a designated contact period. During this period six in-person, o-
campus contacts per prospective student-athlete are permitted during this time period but there
are six times throughout this period where contact cannot be made. April 15-May 31, 2009 is
an evaluation period during which institutions can select a four weeks in which to make visits to
prospective athletes for the purposes of evaluating their academic and athletic ability.
NCAA regulations specify an identical compensation package that can be oered to each
prospective student-athlete. The \full-ride" grant-in-aid package consists of all tuition and fees,
room and board, books and a small stipend, often called \laundry money." In addition, the num-
ber of football scholarships that institutions can provide is currently limited to 85. From 1977 to
51992 the limit was 95 scholarships. The NCAA further imposes regulations regarding the role of
alumni and other non-university aliated individuals in athlete recruitment eorts. In essence,
oers of payment of any kind, cash or otherwise, from anyone to a prospective student-athlete as
an inducement to commit to a particular university are prohibited.
Mechanisms to enforce the recruitment regulations and punish violators are provided in the
NCAA regulations. Initially, the Sanity Code provided for the establishment of a Compliance
Committee to rule on cases of suspected violations brought forth by the Fact-Finding Committee.
Prior to 1953, the only form of punishment available to the Compliance Committee was termina-
tion of the violator's NCAA membership decided by a vote of all NCAA members. (Depken and
Wilson, 2006). While termination of NCAA membership appears to be a suciently strong deter-
rent to cheating, the requirement of NCAA membership approval for imposing the penalty greatly
diminishes its credibility. The enforcement mechanisms were revised in 1953 to provide the former
Compliance Committee (now renamed the Committee on Infractions) with the autonomy to impose
a range of penalties on violators without membership approval. Penalties include public reprimand,
reductions in the number of scholarships that institutions can oer, bans on television and post-
season appearances, restrictions on the recruiting activities of coaches, and forfeiture of conference
titles. The most severe penalty available to the Committee on Infractions is the so-called \death
penalty" which is a complete shutdown of an athletic program. In practice, the \death penalty"
is rarely imposed; to date, it has been imposed only once, on Southern Methodist University for
one year in 1987. Finally, in recent years, the NCAA has allowed member institutions to initi-
ate self-sanctions for violations of NCAA regulations. The timing of the self-imposed punishment
occurs after the institution has come under investigation for violations but before the NCAA has
completed its investigation and meted out its punishment.
Monitoring compliance with the recruiting regulations occurs both at the NCAA organizational
level and within the ranks of the member institutions. The Committee on Infractions has a small
sta of employees assigned to investigating compliance with NCAA recruiting regulations. The
sta is not suciently large to monitor the activities of all member institutions across all sports.
As a practical matter, the recruiting regulations are enforced through self-monitoring by member
institutions. This behavior is consistent with cartel theory. Monitoring all institutions' behavior
on the player recruitment front would be prohibitively expensive. Tens of thousands of high school
students at all stages of their athletic careers are contacted by NCAA member institutions each
year and the recruiting calendars vary by sport. To avoid these high monitoring costs and maintain
cartel stability, cartels typically turn to indirect and probabilistic methods to detect violation of
the cartel agreement. This is where informational asymmetries exist that give rise to the possibility
6of tit-for-tat strategies. Member schools cannot, in most cases, directly observe a rival institution
cheating on the agreement but must infer it from other signals such as on-eld performance or
success in signing highly regarded recruits. However, in some cases rival member institutions may
have information about cheating by another institution. For example, institutions located near to
each other may frequently compete to sign the same high school athletes. If one school violates
NCAA recruiting regulations, the rival could learn about this from the athlete, or infer it from the
decision made by that high school athlete. However, these cases may be rare.
NCAA Recruitment and Tit-for-Tat Strategies
The argument may be made that the NCAA recruitment and competition regulations are designed
to promote parity across all member institutions in terms of recruiting and to protect the amateur
status of student-athletes. However, from an economic perspective, the recruitment regulations
constitute a cartel agreement that explicitly restricts competition among institutions for the player
component of the input market.2 Absent the cartel agreement, in the form of recruiting regulations,
colleges and universities would compete for student-athletes on a price basis and would have an
incentive to expend considerable resources in attracting highly talented athletes, thereby increasing
athletic program costs and reducing overall net returns earned by the athletic program. Even
though the cartel agreement species the compensation package that can be oered to prospective
athletes, a level playing eld is not ensured because the non-monetary benets from attending
schools varies. Big-time college programs with luxurious practice facilities, large fan-bases, major
conference aliations and wide television exposure have a recruiting advantage over smaller or less
visible schools. This imbalance, and the large revenues that can be earned by successful football and
men's basketball teams, creates a powerful incentive to cheat on the NCAA recruitment agreement.
As in any cartel, the payo to an individual school for cheating on the agreement can be
considerable. In the NCAA, the incentive has likely grown given recent growth in the revenues
available to successful athletic programs, especially football programs. The number of post season
bowl games has increased considerably in college football as have the payouts associated with bowl
appearances. 3 Athletic directors and coaches may choose to violate the NCAA agreement if
they believe that the short-term gain (both monetary and non-monetary) to improving on-eld
performance by illegally recruiting highly-regarded athletes outweighs the future expected losses
2It is worth noting that member institutions compete vigorously on the coaching component of the input market
where there are no agreements about the compensation packages that can be oered to the coaching sta.
3The 2006-2007 post-season bowl season featured 31 bowl games with a minimum payout of $300,000 to each
participating institution. The four bowl games comprising the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) each paid $8 million
to participating schools and the national championship game paid $17 million to the two competing institutions.
7if caught and punished. Despite the incentive to cheat on the agreement, the long-term stability
of the NCAA suggests that the range of penalties that the NCAA can impose on \caught and
convicted" violators is sucient to deter widespread and persistent cheating that would eventually
lead to the demise of the cartel. The NCAA as a whole continues to follow the cartel agreement but
some cheating by some minority of members does occur in nearly every period. There appear to be
periods of cooperation and noncooperation by member institutions over the life of the organization.
The conduct of NCAA member institutions is conceptually consistent with tacit collusion in
which tit-for-tat strategies emerge as sustainable equilibrium strategies. The recruitment season in
NCAA Division 1A football is divided into periods that specify when a school may or may not be
in contact with prospective athletes. If the recruiting season is a period of play, then the NCAA
player recruitment process can be described as a nitely repeated game. In each period, member
institutions must decide whether to conform to the rules of the recruiting agreement (cooperate)
or violate the rules in any number of ways (do not cooperate). In this nitely repeated game, the
familiar backwards induction argument leads to defection in every period as the unique dominant-
strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this theoretical outcome has not been supported by many
experimental studies (for example, Andreoni and Miller (1993)) of the Prisoners' Dilemma in which
players do cooperate in many periods. Kreps et. al. (1982) address the contradiction between the
theoretical prediction and experimental evidence of the nitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
by showing that cooperative behavior can be an equilibrium strategy when there are informational
asymmetries. Cooperative behavior might be characterized by a tit-for-tat strategy. In general
terms, the tit-for-tat strategy is to begin the game by cooperating. Firms will play the cooperative
strategy in any period so long as rival rms played the cooperative strategy in the preceding period.
Put another way, the tit-for-tat strategy is to cooperate at the initial rounds of the game and then
mimic the opponent's move in the previous round, ultimately leading to mutual defection in the
nal rounds. Collusion is rarely perfect making it unlikely that rms would actually behave as
the pure tit-for-tat strategy would predict but instead would follow a type of tit-for-tat strategy.
This is the conceptual approach we employ in analyzing the conduct of NCAA member institutions
with respect to player recruitment. We expect that schools will adopt a type of tit-for-tat strategy
and that conduct will vary between cooperative and non-cooperative over time. Whether or not
schools cooperate with the NCAA agreement will depend in part on whether they believe that rival
institutions have been cooperating or not, and the nature of the information on rivals' behavior
that each institution has. It will also depend on the severity of the sanctions levied against rivals
who are caught cheating on the regulations and punished for the violation.
8Empirical Analysis
The existence of tit-for-tat strategies in NCAA Division 1 football is an empirical question. The
nature of intercollegiate sports, and the information made public by the NCAA when enforcing
recruiting rules, identifying violators, and imposing sanctions on the guilty, provides a rich amount
of data on both on-eld performance, institution characteristics, and NCAA sanctions. We observe
these events over a long period of time, the variables of interest exhibit considerable variation and
the dynamics of the interaction among members can be investigated.
Our empirical analysis consists of the collection of a panel data set of on-eld performance,
institution characteristics, and NCAA enforcement activities, the development of an econometric
model, and the estimation of the unknown parameters of this model.
Data Description
We collected data for all institutions that played Division IA football from 1978 to 2005. Division
IA, now inelegantly called the College Football Bowl Subdivision, is the largest and most prestigious
classication of football programs in the NCAA. The other classications are, in descending order
of size and prestige, the College Football Championship Subdivision (formerly Division 1-AA), Di-
vision II and Division III. Division III institutions are prohibited from oering athletic scholarships
to student athletes. The sample contains 2,963 institution years. The sample does not form a
balanced panel because institutions have moved in and out of Division IA over time. During the
sample period, there were as many as 113 and as few as 103 dierent institutions playing Division
IA football. The general trend has been for institutions that formerly played in lower NCAA clas-
sications to move up to Division 1A in hopes of increasing their revenues from football. However,
only a small number of institutions have made this move in the past 10 years.
Data on overall wins and losses, conference wins and losses, nal poll standings, stadium capac-
ity, attendance, conference championships, bowl appearances, and coaching experience come from
various issues of NCAA Football, an annual publication of the National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
ation. Data on recruiting violations and sanctions handed out to the violators by the Committee
on Infractions was collected from the NCAA Committee on Infractions Major Infraction data base,
available on line on the NCAA web site.
The sample contains 87 unique cases where a member institution was found to be guilty of
violating NCAA recruiting regulations and was punished in some way. Instances of enforcement
are relatively rare in the sample. On average, just over three schools are found guilty of violating
NCAA recruiting regulations and placed on probation in any year. No schools were put on probation
9in 1980, and a high of seven were put on probation in 1986.
Despite the infrequency of sanctions against institutions, a number of these sanctions seem to
be meted out to teams located near to one another that also play each other regularly at roughly
the same time. For example, Auburn University was sanctioned for violating recruiting regulations
in 1993 and the University of Alabama was sanctioned in 1995. These two schools are in the
same state, located about 190 miles apart, and play each other in football every year as part of
the Southeastern Conference schedule. The University of Mississippi was sanctioned for violating
recruiting regulations in 1994 and Mississippi State University was sanctioned in 1996. Both schools
are again in the same state and play in the Southeast Conference and are located about 115 miles
apart. Arizona State University was sanctioned for violating recruiting regulations in 1981 and the
University of Arizona was sanctioned in 1983. Both schools are in the same state, play annually
in the Pacic 10 Conference, and are located 108 miles apart. We posit that these events, and
a number of others with similar characteristics, are not simply coincidence. In these cases, one
explanation for the behavior of the institutions and the sanctions is that the two institutions
\ratted" on each other in that they played some role in instigating an NCAA investigation into
recruiting violations committed by the other institution. We interpret this as evidence of strategic
behavior among competitors for athletic talent in the NCAA football cartel. In order for this type
of strategic interaction to be eective, placing an institution's football program on probation must
have some detrimental eect on the program. In the next section, we explore the consequences of
NCAA sanctions.
The Consequences of Probation
Teams placed on probation by the NCAA face a variety of sanctions. Sanctions vary in severity
and can include public reprimand, restrictions placed on recruiting activities by coaches, loss of
scholarships, bans on postseason appearances, bans on television appearances, and the so-called
\death penalty" where the football program is shut down for one or more years. In our sample, the
\death penalty" was handed out in only one instance. The football program at Southern Methodist
University was given the \death penalty" for one season in 1987. Interestingly, the \death penalty"
has not been imposed since. It is not clear why, since other institutions have been sanctioned
multiple times since then.
The penalties for violating NCAA recruiting regulations are designed to deter rule breaking
and punish violators. However, the consequences of probation may extend beyond the penalties
themselves, and aect the team's on-eld success and revenues. In order to test the hypothesis that
the eects of NCAA sanctions aects on-eld success, attendance, and end of season rankings over
10Table 1: Eects of NCAA Sanctions Over Time
Sanction S+1 S+2
Change in # of wins from year before sanctions to 0.09 -0.12 -0.17
Change in # of conference wins from year before sanctions to 0.20 -0.03 -0.03
Change in total attendance from year before sanctions to -3016 2482 6145
Change in Standardized AP Ranking from year before sanctions to 1.6 0.7 -4.0
Change in Standardized UPI Ranking from year before sanctions to -6.2 -.98 -2.7
time, we calculated the average change in the number of wins, number of conference wins, winning
percentage, total attendance, and average end-of-season ranking in polls from the year before a
team was placed on probation until two years after the team was placed on probation. Table 1
shoes some unconditional summary statistics describing the consequences of NCAAA sanctions
over time.
The rst row of Table 1 shows the average change in the number of football wins in the season
that NCAA sanctions were imposed, and the following two seasons, compared to the season before
the sanctions were imposed. Although there is a slight increase in football wins in the season the
sanctions are put in place relative to the previous year, in each of the next two seasons there is
a decline in the number of football wins. The second row on Table 1 shows the same changes for
conference wins. There is not much evidence that conference wins change in response to NCAA
sanctions.
The third row of Table 1 shows the average dierence in total season attendance for teams
placed under NCAA sanctions compared to the total attendance the year before the sanctions were
imposed. Teams placed on probation sell about 3,000 fewer tickets over the course of the rst season
of probation. However, this eect does not persist, and 3,000 is not a large number of tickets given
that the average season attendance in the sample is 254,447.
The nal two rows of Table 1 show the eects of NCAA sanctions on the ranking of teams in
nal polls. Unlike practically every other sport in the world, NCAA Division 1A does not determine
the champion through a postseason tournament. Instead, Division 1A football teams participate
in postseason bowl games - one o contests held in popular tourist locations in the US, usually
in warm weather cities, during the period mid-December through early January4. The national
champion in NCAA Division IA football is determined by expert voting in two football \polls."
4This is actually a simplication of the process. Since 1992, a group of postseason bowl games called the Bowl
Championship Series Series has matched the highest ranked teams at the end of the season in a group of high prole
bowl games. The winner of one of these games is crowned the \National Champion." however, this is not a postseason
tournament and there is still considerable controversy surrounding the Bowl Championship series.
11One poll, the Associated Press (AP) Poll, draws its voters from the ranks of media members who
cover college football. The other poll, called the UPI poll here, draws its voters from the ranks
of college football coaches. The UPI (an acronym for United Press International) poll no longer
exists, having been replaced by the USAToday/CNN Poll in 1991, but this poll still draws its voters
from the ranks of active Division 1A college football coaches. The voters in these polls ll out a
ballot each week listing the 20 best (after 1990 25 best) college football teams in Division IA ranked
in order from 1 to 20 (or 25). The 20 or 25 teams that have the highest aggregate ranking are
published in newspapers each week as the Top 20 or Top 25. A considerable amount of media and
fan attention is focused on poll rankings in Division 1A college football throughout the season,
and it is widely accepted as a signicant indicator of team quality. While there is wide agreement
between the two polls, they are not identical and at times in the past the two polls have not agreed
on the #1 team in the country at the end of the season.
The poll rankings are not easy to compare over time, since the top 20 vote getters were identied
prior to 1990 and the top 25 vote getters were identied from 1991 on. In order to compare poll
rankings across time, we created a standardized ranking variable
SRijs =
NSis + 1   TRijs
NSis
 100
where SRijs is the standardized end of season ranking for poll i for team j in season s, NSis is
the number of positions in poll i in season s, and TRjs is the nal ranking in poll i for team j in
season s. The index i takes on only two values, AP or UPI. The variable NSis also takes on just
two values, 20 or 25. SRijs is equal to 100 for the team (or teams) ranked #1 in each poll at the
end of each season, and is equal to either 4 or 5 for the last ranked team. SRijs is equal to zero for
unranked teams. An increase of one place in the poll rankings is equivalent to an increase of 4.5 in
the standardized rankings.
based on the last two rows of Table 1, NCAA sanctions have an eect on the average end of
season ranking of the teams that are placed on probation. College football coaches are prohibited
from casting votes for teams under sanction by the NCAA, which is re
ected in the UPI poll. The
AR poll rankings are also aected by the sanctions, but only after several years have passed. In
the third year after sanctions take eect, the average nal season poll ranking for sanctioned teams
is about one place lower in the polls, on average.
In summary, the indirect eects of NCAA sanctions appear to be relatively weak. Although
teams placed on probation by the NCAA win slightly fewer games, have a bit lower attendance, and
are ranked a bit lower in postseason polls in the years following the imposition of NCAA sanctions,
these eects are relatively trivial in an economic sense.
12Evidence of Tit-for-Tat Behavior
In this section we develop empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the pattern of observed
NCAA sanctions for breaking football recruiting regulations re
ects strategic behavior among com-
petitors. This evidence takes two forms: anecdotal evidence from published reports of the NCAA
Committee of Infractions and conditional empirical evidence from regression analysis of the inci-
dence of NCAA sanctions over the period 1978-2005.
Most NCAA Division IA football teams are organized into conferences, composed of between
8 and 16 institutions that play each other every year. Some institutions, called \independents"
are not members of a conference. Most NCAA Division 1A conferences have some geographic
basis. For example the Big 10 Conference is composed of large public institutions in the mid
west (with the exception of Northwestern University, which is a relatively small private university);
however, since 1994 it has had 11 members. The Pacic 10 Conference is composed of universities
large public universities (with the exception of Stanford and the University of Southern California
which are private) in Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona. Conferences set schedules
and provide a stable group of competitors, award championships, and also regulate some aspects of
play like organizing and providing ocials and engage in some economic activities like administering
revenue sharing agreements. Any conference with 12 members can stage a championship football
game at the conclusion of the regular season and before the beginning of the postseason bowl
season. While many NCAA conferences have been in existence for many years and have a stable
membership, our sample period also contains quite a bit of variation in conference membership. In
the early 1990s, members of two prominent conferences, the Southwest Conference, composed at
that time of universities in Texas and Oklahoma, and the Big 8 Conference merged to form the
Big 12 Conference. At the same time, the Big East Conference was formed by a group of formerly
independent colleges and universities on the Eastern seaboard.
During the sample NCAA sanctions are not spread evenly over conferences in Division 1A,
in both absolute terms and in relative terms. Table 2 shows the number of individual sanctions,
the fraction of sanctions and the fraction of total team seasons in the data set accounted for by
conferences that had sanctioned teams during the sample period. The fractions do not sum to 100
because some conferences, for example Conference USA, has never had a member on probation
while it was in the conference. The totals for independents { teams not aliated with a conference
{ are included for comparison, but the independents do not constitute a conference in any way.
The Southeast, Southwest and Pacic 10 conferences account for almost half of the individual
episodes of NCAA sanctions during the sample period. This might not be surprising, given that
these are relatively large conferences that have been in existence for a long time. However, if
13Table 2: Distribution of Sanctions and Team Seasons
Conference # of Sanctions % of Sanctions % of Sample
Atlantic Coast 5 5.75 8.03
Big 10 8 9.20 9.89
Big 12 4 4.60 4.05
Big 8 8 9.20 4.86
Big East 4 4.60 3.21
Mountain West 1 1.15 1.92
Pacic 10 12 13.79 9.45
Pacic Coast 1 1.15 2.19
Sun Belt 1 1.15 0.81
Southeastern 18 20.69 10.50
Southwest 9 10.34 5.23
Western Athletic 4 4.60 9.21
Independents 12 13.79 13.40
sanctions were evenly distributed across conferences, then the fraction of team seasons that each
conference accounts for in the sample would be roughly equal to the faction of sanctions accounted
for by that sample. This is clearly not the case. The Atlantic Coast Conference accounts for about
8% of the team years in the sample, but only 5.75% of the sanctions the Western athletic conference
accounts for over 9% of the tea years in the sample, but only 4.6% of the sanctions. Not much
punishment is meted out to teams in these conferences. On the other hand, The Southeastern and
now defunct Southwest conferences have been punished quite a bit, even when compared to their
relative importance in the sample.
Sanctions could be clustered in certain conferences for many reasons. The expected value of
cheating could be higher in some conferences, leading to a greater incidence of rule breaking in
those conferences. Or some conferences could have characteristics that make it easier to detect
rule breaking, for example closer geographic proximity. However, another reason for clustering
of sanctions in conferences could be strategic tit-for-tat behavior. If one institution gets caught
breaking recruiting violations and punished, that institution could report competing institutions to
the NCAA, leading to sanctions against that institution, and so on. One way to determine if this
sort of behavior is driving any of the observed NCAA sanctions is to examine the detailed reports
of the NCAA Committee on Infractions, the organization that investigates reported instances of
cheating, determines if rules were broken, and determines the punishment.
14Anecdotal Evidence From the Public Reports
As part of every major infraction investigated and punished by the NCAA, the NCAA committee
charged with investigating violations and determining sanctions, the NCAA Committee on Infrac-
tions, issues a \Public Report." The content of these reports, which are available on line at the
NCAA web site, vary widely. In some cases they are nothing more than a brief press release like
statement, but in other cases these reports contain quite a bit of information about the recruiting
violations, and in some cases how the NCAA found out about the violations. While we recognize
that this is not systematic evidence of strategic behavior, a careful reading of these reports shows
several instances that could be interpreted as retaliation by rivals in recruiting wars.
For those reports that contain detailed descriptions of the violations committed, many institu-
tions are detected cheating through luck, or the cheating is exposed in the media. For example,
several reports indicate that the football program was found to be in violation of recruiting rules
during the course of an investigation into a dierent team on campus. In one case, at the University
of Miami, recruiting violations came to light during the course of a criminal investigation into drug
dealing at the university. One type of tit-for-tat strategic behavior involves agents of one institution
informing the NCAA that a rival institution has violated recruiting rules when this violation would
not normally have been detected by the NCAA. In that sense, it requires incomplete information
{ one institution must have some information that the NCAA does not possess. Such a situation
could easily take place between rival schools located in close proximity to one another. Most college
football recruits come from high schools in the same state as the college team that they ultimately
play for, or in nearby states (Dumond et al. 2008). Institutions in the same state will frequently
compete for the same players again and again. This gives these geographic rivals to learn about the
behavior of the other institution because monitoring is less costly, and they can gain information
from recruits, who would clearly know if another team oered them illegal inducements. While
this tit-for-tat behavior might take the form of leaking the information to newspapers or television
stations, it can also be accomplished directly. Consider the following examples.
University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State University, 1989
The University of Oklahoma's football program was placed on probation in 1989 for violating a
number of recruiting rules. Oklahoma's in-state rival, Oklahoma State University was also placed
on probation for violating recruiting regulations in 1989. These two teams likely competed to sign
top recruits from the state of Oklahoma and other nearby states quite frequently. This would
provide both institutions with information about the other's recruiting practices. The following
excerpts are taken directly from the NCAA's public report on Oklahoma's rule violation case:
15This case began with information reported during interviews conducted in the NCAA's
Operation Intercept program, an ongoing program in which members of the NCAA
enforcement sta interview highly recruited prospective student-athletes (particularly
in the sports of basketball and football). During the 1984-85 academic year, information
that involved possible NCAA rule violations in the university's football program was
reported to the NCAA during Operation Intercept interviews. The information collected
by the NCAA was submitted to the university in writing in August 1985, and the
university was requested to review and respond to the information. The university
responded in writing in June 1986.
...
During the 1985-86 academic year, while the university was preparing its response to the
initial Information submitted by the NCAA, additional Operation Intercept interviews
conducted by the enforcement sta resulted in receipt of new information indicating the
possibility of rules violations in the university's football program.
...
In October 1986, two former student-athletes, who had transferred to other institutions,
were interviewed. They provided additional information regarding possible violations
of NCAA legislation in the university's football program.
The rules violations found in this case include: arrangements by an assistant football
coach for a prospective student-athlete, who had signed a letter of Intent, to be em-
ployed by a representative of the university's athletics interests who then provided an
automobile and over $6,000 for summertime \employment," even though the prospect
provided no services for these benets; an oer of $1,000 to a prospective student-athlete
by an assistant football coach as an attempt to induce the young man to attend the
university ...
The committee also found that an assistant coach ignored a warning from the head
football coach and became involved in a \bidding war" for a highly recruited prospec-
tive student-athlete. Subsequently, the assistant coach denied his involvement in these
activities and attempted to get persons knowledgeable of the matter to change their
testimony.
Note that the report does not say what institution the Operation Intercept interviews took place
at. These interviews could have taken place at Oklahoma's rival, Oklahoma State. In addition,
16the report does not state who the other party was in the \bidding war" for the services of the
recruit. However, a careful reading of the report on the case against Oklahoma State claries the
situation, and also suggests tit-for-tat behavior in this instance. The following excerpts come from
the NCAA's public report on the recruiting violation case against Oklahoma State:
This infractions case began in February 1984 when anonymous and condential sources
telephoned the NCAA enforcement sta concerning the recruiting activities of one of
the university's then assistant football coaches. In November 1984, an enrolled student-
athlete contacted the enforcement sta concerning possible violations of NCAA legis-
lation. Other sources included reports from a student-athlete enrolled at another insti-
tution; calls from three head football coaches from other NCAA member institutions
about the university's recruiting practices and information reported during interviews
conducted in the NCAA's Operation Intercept program.
...
In the most serious nding, a former assistant football coach became involved in a
\bidding war" with a very talented and highly visible prospective student-athlete. This
coach \won the bidding war" (which also resulted in NCAA penalties for three other
institutions), and during the young man's enrollment, the student-athlete contributed
signicantly to the football team's success. Among the benets actually provided to the
young man were: a payment of $5,000 cash upon signing the National Letter of Intent;
payments in cash averaging $125 during the rst year of enrollment and $200 during
the second year; the provision of an expensive and distinctive sports car at no cost to
the young man with the title being placed in the name of the young man's brother,
and payments for the car and insurance being made by three representatives of the
university's athletics interests.
University of Mississippi and Mississippi State University, 1994-1996
The University of Mississippi (\Ole Miss") was found to be in violation of NCAA recruiting rules
and placed on probation in 1994. Its in-state rival, Mississippi State University, was found to be
in violation of recruiting rules and placed on probation in 1996. The following passages come from
the NCAA public report on the University of Mississippi case:
On December 8, 1992, the NCAA enforcement sta received information from an indi-
vidual concerning possible violations of NCAA rules within the football program at the
University of Mississippi. As a result of that information, in early 1993 and continuing
17through the remainder of the year, the NCAA enforcement sta conducted interviews
with current and former university sta members, university student-athletes, student-
athletes enrolled at other NCAA member institutions who had been recruited by the
University of Mississippi from either high school or junior college, and other individu-
als who purportedly had knowledge of potential violations of NCAA legislation in the
university's football program.
The Southeastern Conference oce also received information concerning alleged viola-
tions of NCAA rules in the university's football program and also conducted an inquiry.
In May 1993, conference ocials provided the NCAA enforcement sta and university
representatives with the information they had received and had developed regarding
the alleged violations of NCAA rules at the university.
Note that the individual who reported Ole Miss to the NCAA is not identied, nor is the way
the Southeastern Conference was notied. Based on the NCAA public report on the case against
Mississippi State, it appears that the violations there were also brought to light by an anonymous
source:
In April and September 1992, the NCAA enforcement sta received telephone reports
of several allegations of NCAA violations concerning the institution. In January 1993,
an NCAA enforcement representative began to monitor the information. In May 1993,
a former employee of a representative of the institution's athletic interests contacted the
NCAA enforcement sta to report that the representative had provided extra benets
to student-athletes. The sta followed up on this information throughout 1993 and the
spring of 1994 in an attempt to corroborate the reported allegation as well as other
information received as the inquiry continued. The enforcement sta conducted on-
campus interviews in July and November 1994. All issues regarding the eligibility of
any student-athletes with eligibility remaining were resolved.
The timing of the initial reports of rule violations are quite close, and both cases of violations
were discovered by anonymous contacts. Once again, Ole Miss and Mississippi State probably
competed frequently for the services of football recruits, providing the asymmetric information and
motivation for engaging in tit-for-tat behavior.
In addition to these two examples, the following groups of NCAA sanctions clustered within
conferences and involving institutions in the same or adjacent states were identied:
 Clemson (1982) and North Carolina State (1983) in the Atlantic Coast Conference
18 Wisconsin (1981), Illinois (1984), Wisconsin (1984) and Illinois (1988) in the Big 10 Confer-
ence.
 Oregon State (1981) and Oregon (1982) in the Pacic 10 Conference
 Arizona State (1981) and Arizona (1983) in the Pacic 10 Conference
 Washington (1994) and Washington State (1995) in the Pacic 10 Conference
 Southern California (2002) and California (2002) in the Pacic 10 Conference
 Syracuse (1992) and Pittsburgh (1993) in the Big East Conference
 Florida (1985) and Georgia (1985) in the Southeastern Conference
 Auburn (1993) and Alabama (1995) in the Southeastern Conference
 Southern Methodist (1985), Texas Christian (1986), Texas (1987), Texas Tech (1987), Texas
A & M (1988), and Houston (1989) in the Southwest Conference
In total, these examples account for 31 of the 87 unique instances of the imposition of NCAA
sanctions for violating recruiting regulations in the sample period. A signicant number of the
observed violations that were punished by the NCAA were associated with another violation by
a close rival institution that was also punished by the NCAA within a few seasons. This high
incidence of clustering of sanctions in conferences and in time suggests that some sort of strategic
interaction occurred between rival institutions.
Empirical Evidence
While the above descriptions are suggestive of strategic interaction, the analysis is unconditional.
It does not hold other factors that might in
uence the imposition of NCAA sanctions constant.
Since a number of factors have been shown to predict the imposition of NCAA sanctions, it is
important to control for these factors when analyzing the imposition of NCAA sanctions against
an institution. Fleisher et al (1988) and Humphreys and Ruseski (2009) have analyzed factors that
predict the imposition of NCAA sanctions on football teams.
In order to analyze the relationship between the imposition of NCAA sanctions and rivals
behavior, we estimate a limited dependent variable econometric model of the probability that a
given NCAA Division 1A institution is on probation in any given season. We dene a dichotomous
variable Ycjt which is equal to 1 if team j in conference c is placed on probation in season s, and
equal to 0 otherwise.
19Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Institution on Probation 0.05 0.22
Wins 5.73 2.67
Standardized Rank (UPI) 11.16 25.2
Years Head Coach Experience 7.26 6.81
Attendance as a fraction of capacity 0.78 0.31
Other conference teams on probation, last three years 1.68 2.29
We estimate a xed eects logit model. In this case, a logit model is more appropriate than
a probit model because an unobservable conference specic eect can be estimated using logit,
but not using probit. The pattern of NCAA sanctions against rule violators in Table 2 suggests
that conference aliation has an important eect on rule breaking and sanctions. Formally, the
regression model estimated is
P[Ycjt 6= 0jXcjt] =
eXcjt
1 + eXcjt (1)
where the dependent variable Ycjt indicates the season s when institution i in conference c was
placed on probation. Xcjt is a vector of explanatory variables and  is a vector of unknown
parameters to be estimated. Equation (1) is estimated by Maximum Likelihood.
The explanatory variables in Equation (1) include variables used by Humphreys and Ruseski
(2009) that have been shown to predict the imposition of NCAA sanctions: a lag of the number
of wins by the football team, the years of experience of the head coach, and a variable re
ecting
the attendance in the previous season expressed as a percentage of the capacity of the institutions
football stadium. In addition to those explanatory variables used by Humphreys and Ruseski
(2009), Equation (1) includes a variable re
ecting the standardized UPI ranking of team j in the
previous season, a variable indicating the number of other teams in conference c that team j is a
member of that were placed on probation in the current season or in the past two seasons, and
a vector of conference dummy variables that capture unobservable conference-specic factors that
aect the probability that a team in conference c will be put on probation.
Summary statistics for these variables are shown on Table 3. The rst year that NCAA sanctions
were imposed on the 87 instances of rule violations in the sample account for only 5% of the
institution years in the sample. Although the sanctions can, and often do, last more than one
season, we are only interested in when he sanction was imposed in this application. The mean
winning percentage is greater than 0.500 in this sample because NCAA Division 1A teams are
20allowed to occasionally play a game against a team from Division 1-AA. The mean standardized
rank of 11.16 indicates that the average team in the sample was ranked about two spots from he
last rank in the poll. However, in 2,331 of the institution years in the sample this variable is equal
to zero, so ranking is a relatively infrequent event for some institutions. On average, institutions
sell about 78% of their available tickets in each season. On average, there were just over one and
a half teams that had been placed under NCAA sanctions in the past three years for the average
team in the sample; 1,364 observations for this variable are equal to zero.
Table 4 shows the parameter estimates, P-values and summary statistics from the logit model,
Equation (1). We have only 1,788 usable observations because of lags in the empirical model,
because the xed eects logit model drops observations from all conferences that did not have
a member who was placed on probation during the sample, and because attendance gures are
missing for a few years in the 1990s for about 30% of the institutions in the sample. In general,
the model explains about 10% of the variation in the dependent variable. This is quite a bit more
of the variation in this variable than was explained by the probit model estimated by Humphreys
and Ruseski (2009), probably because of the additional explanatory variables (in particular the
conference-specic eects) included here. The other parameter estimates have the expected sign
and are signicantly dierent from zero at conventional levels of signicance. Teams with a higher
winning percentage in the previous season are more likely to be under NCAA sanctions in the
current season. This is similar to the result reported by Humphreys and Ruseski (2009) and
supports the idea that members make probabilistic assessments of suspected rule violators based
on observable factors like on-eld performance. The higher the team's standardized ranking in the
previous season, the less likely is the imposition of NCAA sanctions in the current season. The more
experience the head coach has, the less likely the team is to be given NCAA sanctions. Humphreys
and Ruseski (2009) posit that this could be attributed to the head coach learning how to avoid
detection, or due to a greater sense of connection to the institution by long standing head coaches,
and the eect of this connection on the cost of violating recruiting regulations. The more tickets
sold on average, the greater the likelihood that the team is under NCAA sanctions. This positive
is interpreted as evidence that the payo to cheating is higher for teams that have large stadiums
and play to full houses, because they can sell more tickets and make more revenues if a winning
team is put on the eld. A number of the conference specic eects, which are not reported here,
were signicant.
The primary variable of interest is the number of other conference teams on probation in the
current and past two years. The more conference teams recently placed under NCAA sanctions, the
more likely a team is to be placed on sanctions, other things, including controlling for unobservable
21Table 4: Estimated Parameters and P-Values, Fixed Eects Logit Model
Explanatory Variable Coecient P-Value
Wins 1 0.096 0.062
Standardized Rank (UPI) 1 -0.010 0.039
Years Head Coach Experience -0.043 0.011
Attendance as a Fraction of Capacity 0.617 0.026
Other conference teams on probation, last three years 0.288 0.000
Pseudo R2 / N 0.109 1788
conference-specic factors related to violating recruiting regulations. We hypothesize that the
positive sign on this parameter is evidence of tit-for-tat strategies. In it-for-tat strategies, if one
institution defects from the cooperative strategy of complying with the cartel agreement, and a
rival learns that the institution has defected, then the rival institution also defects. This would
maker it more likely that both institutions would be caught and punished. Another possible feature
of tit-for-tat strategies would involve turning a rival in to the Committee on Infractions if that rival
is discovered to have defected from the cooperative strategy.
This conditional evidence of tit-for-tat strategic behavior is considerably stronger than the
anecdotal evidence described above. It holds constant a number of factors that have been shown
to explain the imposition of NCAA sanctions in past research, including the eect of monitoring
as captured by past winning percentage, head coach experience, and variation incentives to violate
the regulations as captures by attendance. Based on the sign and signicance of this parameter,
we conclude that the observed patterns of NCAA sanctions over time is consistent with the idea
that institutions in NCAA Division 1A engage use tit-for-tat strategies.
Concluding Remarks
Although game theoretic models of strategic interaction predict that tit-for-tat strategies are op-
timal under some relatively general conditions, the industrial organization literature contains rel-
atively little empirical evidence that tit-for-tat strategies are used in situations where economic
agents engage in strategic behavior. This is in part because there are relatively few instances where
strategic interaction can be observed, and in part because of data limitations. The NCAA football
cartel is one situation where strategic interaction takes place, sucient detailed data are available,
and the conditions for tit-for-tat strategies to emerge as an equilibrium appear to exist.
The anecdotal and empirical evidence developed here strongly supports the hypothesis that
members of NCAA Division 1A play tit-for-tat strategies on some occasions. This is an important
22verication of the predictions of game theoretic models with incomplete information. The specic
settings where we have identied tit-for-tat strategic interaction also has value for advancing the
industrial organization literature in this area. Our evidence suggests that the sort of information
asymmetries that give rise to equilibrium tit-for-tat strategies must be relatively rare in college
football, and that institutions may switch between cooperative and non-cooperative strategies dur-
ing dierent periods in the sample. Our results indicate that only within the context of a college
football conference, where a group of relatively homogenous agents competing in an input market
with a limited geographic scale on a repeated basis do these strategies appear to arise.
Our results have some important limitations that need to be recognized. First, and foremost,
the underlying strategic behavior we are interested in, the decision to play the cooperative strat-
egy of obeying the NCAA recruiting regulations or defecting to the non-cooperative strategy of
breaking these regulations and oering football recruits illegal payments, is not directly observed.
We have no idea how often institutions cheat. We only observe those instances where one or more
institutions defect from the cooperative strategy, are detected, an punished by the NCAA. There
are undoubtedly many more instances of defection from the cooperative strategy than there are
detections of this behavior because of the prohibitive costs of monitoring. In addition, there may
be many instances where the recruiting violation that takes place and is punished is undertaken by
an alumni or other athletic booster not directly aliated with the football program. In these cases,
the rule violation may not have been a decision of the relevant decision maker at the institution.
Still, despite these limitations, we believe that the clustering of NCAA sanctions observable in
these data are not just some artifact of random behavior. Division 1A NCAA football contains
evidence that institutions play tit-for-tat strategies. In addition, the data are consistent with the
idea that institutions employ a mixture of cooperative and non-cooperative strategies over time,
and that the incidence of non-cooperative behavior is concentrated in a few large, prestigious
conferences. Finally, the limited incidence of non-cooperative behavior leads to stability in the
cartel, suggesting that the penalty structure devised by the NCAA is credible; this conrms that
the conditions for sustained cooperation { that the long term losses associated with defecting and
being punished exceed the short term gains from that behavior { exist in the industry.
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